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Forgiveness as Institution: A Merleau-Pontian Account 
 Recent literature on forgiveness suggests that a successful account of the 
phenomenon must satisfy at least three criteria. First, an account must be able to explain 
how the act of forgiving, which involves the forgoing of resentment toward a purported 
wrongdoer, can be responsive to reasons. Following Pamela Hieronymi and Owen Ware, 
we can call this first criterion the articulateness condition.  Second, an account of 1
forgiveness must be able to explain how forgiveness can be uncompromising. According 
to Hieronymi, this means that the account must be able to explain how one can rationally 
choose to forgo resentment toward the wrongdoer while nonetheless holding fixed three 
different but closely related judgments: that the act for which the person is to be forgiven 
really was a serious wrong that deserves to be taken seriously, that the wrongdoer is 
responsible for her act, and that the forgiver deserved not to have been wronged.  2
Following Hieronymi and Ware once again, we can call this the uncompromisingness 
condition. And finally, an adequate account must be able to explain how forgiveness is 
elective; it must make sense of our intuition that forgiveness is a kind of gift, that it is not 
something that we owe to the wrongdoer, such that she could demand it as her due.   3
These three criteria are not logically inconsistent, but the history of reflection on 
the ethics of forgiveness nonetheless suggests that they are in tension. Accounts that 
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emphasize articulateness and uncompromisingness tend to suggest an excessively 
deflationary understanding of electiveness, while those that emphasize electiveness tend 
to weaken the safeguards that keep forgiveness distinct from condonation, excuse, or 
mere servility. What I want to argue in this paper is that we can do justice to all three 
conditions by understanding forgiveness in terms of the concept of institution that 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty developed in his work from the early- to mid-1950s. In what 
follows, then, I will begin by explaining why it is so important that an account of 
forgiveness satisfy the three conditions and why it has been so difficult to do so. I will 
then propose an understanding of forgiveness that treats it as an act of institution in 
Merleau-Ponty’s sense, emphasizing the ways in which this conception makes sense of 
our intuitions about articulatneness, uncompromisingness, and electiveness better than 
rival accounts. 
I. The Articulateness and Uncompromisingness Conditions 
A very large percentage of the literature on forgiveness takes as its beginning 
point the conception advanced by Bishop Butler in the eighth and ninth of his Fifteen 
Sermons, according to which forgiveness is the forswearing of excessive resentment.  4
When we feel resentment, according to Butler, what we resent is a perceived injustice and 
never a mere natural harm.  We do not resent a tree when it falls on our car, for example, 5
but we would certainly resent a person who cut the tree down with the intent of making it 
fall there. This fact gives us a clue as to the reason why this passion has been implanted 
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within us: It is because people “are plainly restrained from injuring their fellow creatures 
by fear of their resentment; and it is very happy that they are so, when they would not be 
restrained by a principle of virtue.”  The passion of resentment is valuable to us, in short, 6
because it helps us to prevent and to defend ourselves against moral wrongs. But 
resentment is not unambiguously good: Because we are typically bad judges in our own 
cases, we often resent excessively.  When this happens, resentment can easily turn into 7
malice and the desire for revenge, which give rise to more injuries and thus to more 
resentment.  And so even though resentment has a valuable role to play in our moral 8
lives, it is also important that we forgo our resentment in order to avoid these evils. 
But this account needs further refinement, since we can easily imagine cases of 
renouncing excessive resentment that we would not want to count as cases of forgiveness. 
It is in refining the account of forgiveness so that it does not include too much that the 
necessity of the articulateness and uncompromisingness conditions becomes apparent. 
Let us begin with the articulateness condition. As Pamela Hieronymi notes, both 
resenting and forgiving involve changes in our judgments about others that we believe to 
be justified by good reasons.  For every case of forgiveness, then, we should be able, in 9
principle at least, to give the reasons justifying our change in judgment. If there is no 
such justification to be given, then the forgoing of resentment will have been something 
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other than forgiveness. If I were to stop resenting another person simply because I had 
forgotten about the wrong, for example, I would not allow myself to claim any moral 
credit for having exercised the virtue of forgiveness. This would also be the case if I had 
not forgotten the wrongdoing, but nonetheless my resentment had been slowly eroded by 
the passage of time.  In both of these cases, my change in attitude toward the wrongdoer 10
would not have been based on any kind of judgment that I could stand behind; it would 
be closer to the truth to say that the change happened to me. It may turn out to have been 
for the best that my feelings toward the wrongdoer developed in these ways, and there 
may well have been good reasons for me to encourage those developments, but if my 
forgoing of resentment was not responsive to articulable reasons, then what happened 
will not have been forgiveness properly speaking. 
But not just any articulable reason will do. The point here is not merely that some 
reasons to forgive are bad, such that we would make a mistake if we acted on them. 
Rather, there are some reasons that would make the forgoing of resentment something 
importantly different from forgiveness. These are the reasons that are ruled out by the 
uncompromisingness condition. First, our decision to forgive cannot be based on our 
having concluded that the other person had not actually done the wrong thing, all things 
considered. This is because if the person has not done the wrong thing, there is nothing to 
forgive. This point becomes especially clear if we adopt the point of view of the target of 
resentment: Surely we would find it ridiculous, and probably insulting as well, to be told 
that we have been forgiven on the grounds that the thing we had done was not actually 
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wrong. To forgo resentment in such a case would not be to forgive, but rather to justify.  11
Second, our decision to forgive cannot be based on our concluding that the other person 
did the wrong in question, but should not be held responsible for it. If we found out that a 
person had committed a wrong because he was suffering from severe mental illness, for 
example, or because he had been drugged against his will, then our forgoing of 
resentment would take the form of excusing the wrongdoer, and not of forgiving him.  12
Once again there would be nothing to forgive, since what we forgive are unjustified, 
unexcused wrongs. 
The third reason one must not have for forgoing resentment is that one does not 
deserve to be treated well. Immanuel Kant develops a version of this idea in The 
Metaphysics of Morals, where he argues that we have a duty to be forgiving, but that 
forgiveness “must not be confused with the meek toleration of wrongs.”  To disregard 13
the value of our own humanity in this way is not to practice the virtue of forgiveness but 
rather to commit the vice of servility.  Contemporary writers on forgiveness develop this 14
point by modifying Bishop Butler’s account of the function of resentment: Instead of 
treating it as a defense against moral injuries in general, they focus more specifically on 
its role in defending our self-respect. According to Pamela Hieronymi, when someone 
wrongs us, he effectively claims that we are unworthy of being treated decently. The 
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feeling of resentment protests against this claim. To forgo resentment, then, is to run the 
risk of accepting that claim as legitimate and of viewing oneself as unworthy of basic 
respect.  This would not be forgiveness at all, but rather servility. 15
How can we tell in any particular case whether or not forgiveness would reduce to 
servility? According to one of the recent trends in the literature, exemplified most clearly 
by Hieronymi’s “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness” and by Charles 
Griswold’s book Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, we can do so by establishing 
the conditions in which resentment is rationally warranted. According to Hieronymi, we 
have good reason to resent another person as long as we believe that she persists in 
thinking of us as unworthy of respect. If the wrongdoer sincerely apologizes, though, we 
will have good reason to believe that she has given up her belief that we are unworthy of 
respect, and so the feeling of resentment will no longer be warranted. In that case, we can 
forgive without compromising our self-respect.  Charles Griswold sets the bar for 16
warranted forgiveness considerably higher, demanding that the wrongdoer satisfy six 
conditions: she must (1) acknowledge responsibility for the act, (2) express a recognition 
that the act was morally wrong, (3) express regret for having done it, (4) commit to 
becoming the sort of person who will no longer do such wrongs, (5) express that she 
understands the wrong she has done from the victim’s point of view, and (6) give an 
account of why she did the wrong and of why her act does not represent her whole self.  17
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If the wrongdoer fails to satisfy these conditions, Griswold thinks, then the victim would 
have no rational justification to forgive her. To do so would be to condone the wrong and 
perhaps even to encourage further wrongdoing.  18
II. The Electiveness Condition 
In taking such great care to keep the virtue of forgiveness distinct from the vice of 
servility, though, both of these accounts—and especially Griswold’s—lose sight of the 
elective nature of forgiveness. As Lucy Allais notes, these kinds of accounts treat 
forgiveness as the giving up of resentment that is no longer rationally warranted and that 
we therefore ought not to have. But this is less than what we should want from an account 
of forgiveness.  Specifically, these accounts fail to capture the way in which forgiveness 19
is a gift. We do not need to understand gift here in Derrida’s exacting sense as “the 
unconditional, gracious, infinite, aneconomic forgiveness granted to the guilty as guilty, 
without counterpart.”  The point, rather, is simply that it is conceptually possible to 20
forgive people who have not satisfied the kinds of conditions suggested by Hieronymi, 
Griswold, and others. Indeed when we think of forgiveness as morally praiseworthy, we 
most likely have in mind this kind of generosity and not the “careful weighing up of 
evidence about what kind of emotional response the wrongdoer deserves.”  To miss this 21
 Alexandra Couto argues for a similar conclusion, making use of Stephen Darwall’s idea of the second-18
person standpoint in Couto (2016, pp. 1316-1320). 
 Allais (2013, p. 641).19
 Derrida (2001, p. 34).20
 Allais (2013, pp. 647-648).21
!  7
gift-character of forgiveness, then, would be to miss something essential to the 
phenomenon. 
Another way to think about the tension between accounts that emphasize the 
articulateness and uncompromisingness conditions on the one hand and those that 
emphasize the electiveness condition on the other is that the former suggest what Owen 
Ware calls a Report View of forgiveness while the latter suggest an Avowal View. On the 
Report View, forgiveness is primarily an exercise in theoretical reason.  In deliberating 22
about whether or not to forgive, most of our work is devoted to ascertaining the truth of 
the situation: Has the wrongdoer taken responsibility for her actions? Has she expressed 
regret? Does it seem likely that she will behave differently in the future? Taken too far, 
this view of forgiveness would be unduly passive: Once the facts were in, the only choice 
left would be whether or not to act on the basis of the relevant evidence. As Aurel Kolnai 
noted in his paper “Forgiveness,” this kind of view would render the act of forgiving 
practically redundant.  But this doesn’t seem right: When we forgive, we are more active 23
than that. We experience ourselves as doing something. This intuition is captured by the 
Avowal View, which understands forgiveness as the exercise not of theoretical but of 
practical reason.  To forgive, on this understanding, is not primarily to report that the 24
wrongdoer is in fact different from what she used to be; it is to will to view her 
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differently. Accounts that emphasize electiveness attempt to make sense of this important 
aspect of our experience of forgiveness. 
But if we give too much weight to the elective nature of forgiveness, then we take 
on board exactly those problems that we meant to avoid by insisting on the articulateness 
and uncompromisingness conditions. First, in separating the will to forgive too much 
from its justifying reasons, accounts emphasizing electiveness run the risk of reducing 
forgiveness to mere condonation. Surely to forgive someone is not simply to overlook 
another’s wrongdoing or to treat it as something that is not worth taking very seriously. 
But that is exactly what forgiveness can look like if the decision to forgive is not closely 
guided by reasons having to do with the wrongdoer’s acknowledgement of responsibility 
and change of heart. One of the most important considerations supporting the importance 
of the electiveness condition is that we tend to think of the praiseworthiness of 
forgiveness as being closely linked to the generosity that it demonstrates toward the 
wrongdoer. But what looks like generosity from one point of view can look very much 
like acquiescence from another. And to acquiesce in wrongdoing is to encourage it, which 
is not praiseworthy at all. To illustrate the seriousness of this worry, let us consult an 
example that Lucy Allais puts forward as the kind of case that an adequate account of 
forgiveness should be able to make sense of. The case involves Sicelo Mhlauli, an 
advocate for justice in apartheid-era South Africa who had been brutally murdered by the 
police. Mhlauli “was stabbed sixty-eight times with different weapons, had acid poured 
on his face, and had his hand chopped off and preserved in alcohol at police headquarters 
in Port Elizabeth, where police referred to it as ‘the baboon’s hand’ and used it to 
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intimidate detainees.”  At the conclusion of her testimony before the Truth and 25
Reconciliation Commission, his daughter Babalwa Mhlauli said that she wanted to know 
who was responsible for the murder. Her reason? “‘We do want to forgive, but we don’t 
know whom to forgive.’”  Is this willingness to forgive even in the complete absence of 26
evidence of the unknown wrongdoer’s change of heart something we would regard as 
morally praiseworthy? Is it distinguishable from a willingness to accept the wrong? And 
if not, is this something we would want to call forgiveness at all? The answer to these 
questions is not obvious; many writers on forgiveness, it seems, would want to answer no 
to all three. But even if we believe that Babalwa Mhlauli’s act is best characterized as 
forgiveness, surely there is some threshold beyond which we would want to insist that a 
forgoing of resentment amounts to nothing more than condonation.  27
Closely related to these worries is the problem of self-respect. If we choose to 
forgive a person who has not shown remorse for his wrongdoing or who has not given 
any sign that he will change his ways for the better, do we not demonstrate a lack of 
sufficient respect for ourselves and for our own moral standing? Would we not want to 
say with Kant that such cases are better described as the meek toleration of wrongs rather 
than as acts of forgiveness? Again, it can be difficult to tell the difference in particular 
cases, but surely there is some point beyond which we would want to characterize a 
forgoing of resentment as servility rather than as forgiveness. This is precisely why the 
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articulateness and uncompromisingness conditions are so important, despite their being in 
tension with the electiveness condition. 
III. Constitution and Institution 
 What I would like to argue in the following two sections is that we can do justice 
to the three conditions of forgiveness by understanding the phenomenon in terms of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of institution. The concept, which he took up explicitly 
for the first time in his 1952 essay “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,” and to 
which he devoted his 1954-1955 courses at the Collège de France, is developed as a 
corrective to the philosophy of consciousness, according to which the intelligibility of 
things has its origin in the meaning-bestowing acts of constituting subjectivity. For the 
constituting subject, the world given in experience is “at each moment the exact 
reflection of the acts and powers of consciousness.”  But as Merleau-Ponty had argued 28
already in Phenomenology of Perception, this idea of constituting consciousness accounts 
very poorly for our most common, everyday perceptual experience. The perceiving 
subject is not an absolute consciousness; it is embodied, and so at least to some degree 
passive, responding to and taking up meanings that are already present, if only latently, in 
the sensibly given world. To perceive the world, in short, is to perceive according to it, to 
let oneself be oriented by the sense that it itself adumbrates. This everyday perceptual 
experience is incompatible with a conception of the constituting subject conceived as 
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!  11
possessing in advance, “fully realized, all of the knowledge of which our actual 
knowledge is merely the first approach.”  29
 In order to begin to engage with the idea of institution on its own terms, it will be 
helpful to examine the way in which the idea of constituting subjectivity fails to account 
for the dynamic proper to expression. In the period following the publication of 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty’s work on the phenomenology of 
expression comes to be informed by his reading, or perhaps better by his creative 
misreading, of Saussurian linguistics. One of the central insights of Saussure’s Course in 
General Linguistics is that particular acts of speech (parole) presuppose a linguistic 
structure (langue). The langue in Saussure’s sense is not to be understood as a treasury of 
terms, each of which corresponds one to one with a given meaning. In the langue, rather, 
“there are only differences, and no positive terms.”  And so the meaning of the term 30
“sheep,” for example, is not fixed by its reference to actual sheep that exist in extra-
linguistic space. It is fixed, rather, by the place of the term within the differential structure 
of the langue as a whole: It is not a goat or an alpaca or mutton, etc.  The most important 31
lesson from all this, for present purposes at least, is that the speaking subject cannot 
constitute the meaning “sheep.” In order even to be able to intend something determinate 
like “sheep” at all, the speaker must rely on a whole system of differences that he could 
not possibly have constituted. “The langue,” Saussure insists, “is not a function of the 
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speaking subject; it is the product that the individual registers passively.”  Of course the 32
speaking subject can attempt to modify the meaning of specific terms within the langue, 
but doing so would still presuppose the linguistic system that he wants to change. If he 
does not respect the ordered system of differences that makes up the langue, he will 
produce nonsense, and so he will express nothing intelligible at all. The speaking and 
intending subject, then, finds himself always already in the midst of a source of meaning 
that he cannot have constituted and that he must respect. 
 When Merleau-Ponty takes up the work of Saussure in his lectures and texts from 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, he rejects the sharp dualism of langue and parole that we 
find in the Course in General Linguistics. For Saussure, individual speech acts are merely 
manifestations of the linguistic structure in something like the way an orchestra’s 
performance of a symphony is a manifestation of the symphony itself. “The symphony,” 
he insists, “has a reality of its own, which is independent of the way in which it is 
performed.”  The performance is “ancillary and more or less accidental.”  Merleau-33 34
Ponty, on the other hand, treats langue and parole (or in his own terminology, spoken 
language and speaking language) as two different manifestations of the same thing, and 
not as ontologically distinct realities. On his account, the two sides of the phenomenon of 
language stand in a quasi-dialectical relation, such that spoken language envelops the 
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speaking subject while at the same time being enveloped by it.  The first part of the 35
relation—the envelopment of the speaking subject by the already existing system of 
language—is the one that Saussure’s work emphasizes. But for Merleau-Ponty, the 
spoken language is not a rigid differential structure that the speaking subject registers 
passively. He understands it instead as a nascent, open-ended, expressible but not yet 
determinately expressed dimension of sense that is experienced only vaguely by the 
speaking subject as “a precise uneasiness in the world of things-said.”  The speaking 36
subject, on this account, is actively passive: In order to express herself, she must be 
sensitive to the latent sense within which she finds herself always already, but she must 
also take up this sense, bringing it to determinacy with the help of her meaning-
bestowing intention. This is reflected in the experience of anyone who has struggled to 
give expression to a novel thought: We have an intimation that there is something to be 
said, but this something is present only vaguely. We strain toward what we want to say, 
trying out various formulations in an effort to capture the sense that solicits us. 
Sometimes we hit on exactly the right expression, and the sense that had been given 
nascently is captured in an articulated signification. In these cases of successful 
expression, it seems to us as if the correct formulation had been there all along, and that 
we had merely discovered it. But this is an illusion. We have neither discovered a 
meaning that was already there, fully formed, nor created it ex nihilo. In giving 
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expression to a sense that is present as intimated, we are irreducibly passive and active, 
“receiving and giving in the same gesture.”  37
And this brings us right up to the idea of institution. In his lecture course at the 
Collège de France titled Institution and Passivity, Merleau-Ponty tells us that institution 
refers to “those events in an experience which endow the experience with durable 
dimensions, in relation to which a whole series of other experiences will make sense, will 
form a thinkable sequel or a history.”  To unpack what this means, we can return to the 38
experience we have when we strive to give expression to a new thought. We begin with 
the intimation of sense as being in a precariously stable state, i.e., one in which there is 
some degree of tension between the sense that is expressible and the sense that has 
already been successfully expressed.  By contrast, a stable state of sense would be one in 39
which all the sense that is expressible has already been expressed. In such a state, 
expression would be nothing more than the transmission of signs standing for fully 
transparent significations of which the speaking subject would already be in full 
possession. But genuine expression is not like this. The vaguely given sense that we 
begin with is experienced as soliciting us and as calling for determinate expression. When 
we succeed in giving expression to this sense, we do not put the whole of sense into a 
stable equilibrium, such that there would be no more sense to express. Instead we bring 
about a new precariously stable state that functions as the background for new 
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solicitations and for previously unforeseen possibilities of expression. Or in the language 
of Merleau-Ponty’s definition, we “endow the experience with durable dimensions, in 
relation to which a whole series of other experiences will make sense, will form a 
thinkable sequel or a history.” 
But this first approach to the idea of institution might give a somewhat misleading 
impression, suggesting as it does that it is the subject who opens up new and unforeseen 
dimensions of experience. This is not entirely false, of course. Expression is not 
something that happens to the subject; it requires the activity of a subject with some kind 
of meaning-bestowing intention. Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty tells us that it is events that 
endow experience with durable dimensions. Institution, he thinks, happens in accordance 
with a “subterranean logic” that is not entirely accessible to the subject.  We can see this 40
especially clearly in our affective comportment toward the world. As Kym Maclaren 
notes, our emotions “often take hold of us in ways that we cannot shake by simply, 
stoically, choosing a different attitude.”  In other words, we cannot reconstitute the sense 41
of the situations we find ourselves in by means of unilateral acts of sense-bestowal. 
Instead, emotional transformations typically “happen in unexpected ways, and by virtue 
of some contingent event that suddenly brings upon us, as if from beyond us, an 
epiphany. Suddenly, we experience a revolution not just in our thoughts but in our very 
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being, at the existential level.”  This point is exemplified nicely by a case of childhood 42
jealousy that Merleau-Ponty describes in “The Child’s Relations with Others:” 
The younger of two children shows jealousy when his new [sister] is born. 
During the first days of the newborn child’s life, he identifies with it, carrying 
himself as though he himself were the newborn baby. There is a striking 
regression in language as well as in character.  43
The child, whose name is Gricha, regresses because the familial world within which he 
has always found his bearings is the one in which he acts and is treated as the youngest. 
Faced with the challenge effected by the birth of his younger sister, the boy tries to re-
establish the system of relations that he knows how to navigate: He acts like the 
youngest. But this fails, as his family make clear to him that they expect a different kind 
of behavior from him. The boy responds to this setback by imitating his older brother 
Jean, but this does not work either. So far there has been no institution of new dimensions 
of experience for Gricha, as he still experiences his world as structured by the absolute 
positions of youngest and oldest. This structure is now problematic in a way that it hadn’t 
been before: He can only think of himself as occupying one of two positions, but he 
cannot effectively occupy either. And he lacks the resources to reconstitute the meaning 
of his situation in a way that would resolve the tension he experiences. The tension is 
resolved only with the help of a fortuitous event: Another boy, Serge, who is older than 
all three of the siblings, comes over to play. This event endows the boy’s experience with 
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durable new dimensions, as he becomes capable of recognizing positions within social 
space as relative and not as absolute. His older brother is older than him but younger than 
the visiting friend. Likewise, he himself is older than the newborn baby but younger than 
his older brother. This new sense was not simply there, waiting for the boy to discover it. 
Nor did he create it ex nihilo. Rather the boy “infuse[d] a new meaning into what 
nevertheless called for and anticipated it.”  Once this institution was realized, the boy’s 44
jealousy disappeared.  
IV. Forgiveness as Institution 
I believe that this same kind of subterranean logic describes what happens in 
cases of forgiveness. To show how this is the case, it will be helpful to begin with the 
initial wrongdoing, which we can understand as an event that endows the experience of 
the victim and of the wrongdoer “with durable dimensions, in which a whole series of 
other experiences will make sense.” The wrongdoing, in other words, is itself an 
institution. As Pamela Hieronymi suggested, the offended party will come to feel 
resentment toward the wrongdoer, viewing him as an ongoing threat to her self-respect. 
She will likely treat the act as expressive of the wrongdoer’s enduring character, and so 
she will view him as someone with whom it will be impossible to relate in a mutually 
respectful way. She will treat him with less consideration and empathy than before, and 
will probably withdraw from him as much as is practically possible. In viewing the 
wrongdoer in this way, the offended party does not constitute the new sense of their 
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relationship in a unilateral act of sense-bestowal. Her attitude rather takes up and carries 
forward the momentum of a sense that is already there. 
But to say that the wrong opens up a future with durable dimensions is not to say 
that it determines the future. The parties to the relationship cannot carry the instituted 
sense forward by mechanically repeating it because, as we have seen, there is no “it” to 
repeat. All the elements of the instituted sense—the meaning of the act, its expressiveness 
of the wrongdoer’s character, whether “but for the grace of God” the offended party may 
have acted similarly in similar circumstances, the level of the threat posed to her self-
respect, etc.—are open-ended. The parties will be able to bestow more determinate sense 
on these elements only retroactively, as a function of the ways they choose to carry the 
nascent sense forward. Although they cannot successfully bestow sense in any way they 
might like, they can institute something relatively new, opening up dimensions that call 
for a future different from the one that seemed to have been fixed in place by the initial 
wrong. 
Of course one way to open up the possibility for a different future is to forgive. 
This is easy to see in cases where the wrongdoer apologizes or gives other clear evidence 
of having had a genuine change of heart. These signs have a retroactive effect, revising 
the sense of the wrong and of the threat it poses. Specifically, it gives the offended party 
reason to believe that the wrong was not expressive of the wrongdoer’s enduring 
character. If it is true that resentment is best understood as a defense against disrespect, 
then that feeling no longer seems appropriate in the state of affairs following the apology. 
The situation now calls for forgiveness instead. But I want to argue, against those 
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philosophers who strongly emphasize the articulateness and uncompromisingness 
conditions, that forgiveness can be called for even without the wrongdoer’s having 
apologized. Here, I believe, comparison with the case that Merleau-Ponty described in 
“The Child’s Relations with Others” is especially instructive. Following the birth of his 
younger sister, Gricha tries to carry forward his sense of himself as the youngest. This 
fails, though, and the result is that Gricha’s lived relationship to his younger sister is 
shaped through and through by the feeling of jealousy. Gricha cannot resolve the tension 
within his familial relations simply by reconstituting its sense in terms of the logic of 
relative, as opposed to absolute, positions. Of course part of the reason he cannot do so is 
that he is a very young child and the logic of the new situation is too complex for him to 
grasp. But even if he were more cognitively sophisticated, it would not suffice simply to 
explain the new logic to him and to advise him to think of his relationship to his siblings 
accordingly. This is because our considered judgments about what is best do not always 
reach deeply enough to determine our lived experience. What does succeed in changing 
Gricha’s experience is a fortuitous and seemingly trivial event—Serge’s coming over to 
play—which casts his situation in a new light, crystallizing his sense of his place within 
the family in a way that resolves the tension he had been struggling with. Similarly in the 
case of forgiveness, it might happen that the wrongdoer does a small act of kindness for 
the offended party, or that he smiles as they pass in the hallway. These are not 
unambiguous signs, but they are at least intimations that a different kind of future might 
be possible. Or maybe the offended party has an experience that reveals to her a tendency 
to overestimate the malicious intent behind perceived slights. This realization need not 
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overturn her conviction that she had in fact been wronged, but it at least suggests the 
possibility of relating to the wrongdoer in a different way. In light of such intimations, the 
offended party might experience a pull toward taking the initiative to restore the damaged 
relationship. She might do this simply by making small talk with the wrongdoer or by 
returning his smile in the hallway. In giving these signs, she takes up and attempts to 
carry forward the nascent sense of their relationship, contributing in a small but important 
way toward opening up a future in which relations of good will and mutual respect come 
to appear as real possibilities. The forgiveness here would consist in this event of 
institution. It does not require an explicit declaration that the wrongdoer is forgiven any 
more than Gricha’s new relationship with his siblings requires an explicit declaration that 
he will henceforth behave in accordance with his position as the middle child.  45
This conception of forgiveness as institution is somewhere between a Report 
View and an Avowal View. It is similar to an Avowal View in that the forgiver must 
perform an act of creative sense-bestowal. The act of forgiveness, in other words, is 
something more than the practical acknowledgment that the wrongdoer has in fact 
satisfied a checklist of conditions; it effects a new kind of relationship through a 
commitment to view the wrongdoer differently. It is unlike an Avowal View, though, in 
that it emphasizes to a much greater degree the subject’s implication within a dimension 
of sense that exceeds him and that has a dynamic of its own. According to Owen Ware’s 
version of the Avowal View, we can forgive a wrongdoer by foregrounding our 
recognition respect for her, rendering her dignity as a person more salient and 
 Murphy and Hampton (1988, pp. 42-3); Neblett (1974, p. 269).45
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backgrounding the bad acts that had given rise to our resentment.  Just as in the case of 46
visual perception, though, there must be something in the sense of the situation that 
supports our treating some aspect as foreground and others as background. If nothing in 
our experience calls in any way for this kind of change in our attitude toward the 
wrongdoer, then the forgiveness we attempt to grant will not take. And this is precisely 
what makes the account of institution as forgiveness somewhat similar to a Report View. 
But it is importantly different from a Report View in that the sense of the situation to 
which the act of forgiveness responds is not fully determinate. Again, there is no checklist 
of conditions that the wrongdoer must satisfy. The sense of the relationship between the 
wrongdoer and the victim, rather, is precariously stable, capable of being taken up and 
carried forward in multiple ways. The act of forgiveness responds to the sense that is 
already there, then, but it also contributes toward stabilizing it. Or in Merleau-Ponty’s 
terms once again, the forgiving subject is “receiving and giving in the same gesture.” 
One important advantage of this institution-based understanding of forgiveness is 
that it accounts well for an experience that is underemphasized by many philosophers, 
who tend to over-intellectualize the phenomenon:  Very frequently, the question we face 47
when we respond to another’s serious wrongdoing is not “should I forgive?” but rather 
“can I forgive?” As David Sussman notes, “the possibility here turns not on whether there 
are good enough reasons to forgive, but upon what one can bring oneself to do, what one 
 Ware (2014, p. 254).46
 Allais (2013, p. 637).47
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can live with, how one can see or come to see the supplicant.”  David Novitz makes a 48
similar point when he writes that “forgiveness does not consist in any one act that a 
person can perform at will and that directly results in the banishment of hard feelings.”  49
This is precisely because forgiveness is not the sense-bestowing act of a constituting 
subject. The subject who would forgive, rather, is like the writer who has an intimation 
that there is some thought to be expressed, that some sense is vaguely soliciting her, but 
who must struggle with language until the sense crystallizes. She cannot bring the 
intimated sense to expression all at once by an act of will. Indeed, she may not be able to 
give adequate expression to the intimated sense at all. If the sense is brought to successful 
expression, this will happen as an event in which the subject is as passive as she is active. 
This point about institution generally is especially pertinent to the case of forgiveness, 
where the victim’s perception of the wrongdoer is shaped to such a great degree by the 
feeling of resentment, which is deep seated and which resists our best efforts simply to 
will it away. 
The other major advantage of the account that treats forgiveness as institution, 
finally, is that it satisfies the articulateness, uncompromisingness, and electiveness 
conditions. Let us begin with the latter. Like all kinds of institution, forgiveness attempts 
to bring into being a state of affairs that does not already exist, with no guarantee that the 
attempt will succeed. In The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty describes the way in 
which artistic institution is necessarily addressed to a public that does not yet exist. The 
 Sussman (2005, pp. 90-91).48
 Novitz (1998, p. 308).49
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artist, he says, must draw the public “toward values in which they will only later 
recognize their own values.”  But sometimes artistic innovations turn out to be dead-50
ends: the artist feels called upon to play the sedimented sense forward in a particular way, 
but the public does not follow. When that happens, the attempted institution fails, as no 
thinkable sequel or history is effectively opened up. The same kind of thing can happen 
with forgiveness: Responding to hints in the already instituted sense of her history with 
the wrongdoer, the forgiver launches herself into an uncertain future toward which, if her 
act succeeds, both parties will come to view their relationship as having been destined all 
along. But she cannot be certain that her act will succeed in instituting this future. In 
taking the leap, she goes beyond what is rationally required or even rationally justified. In 
this sense her act is elective. But because the forgiver acts in response to the sense of the 
relationship she has with the wrongdoer—even though this sense is given as nascent and 
open-ended—the forgiveness is also articulate. This means, at very minimum, that it is 
not the result of mere forgetfulness or distraction. But it also means that in forgoing 
resentment, we are doing something more than just manipulating our own emotions; we 
are acting in a way that is sensitive to our judgments about the wrongdoer, so that we are 
in a position to give reasons justifying our forgiveness.  Because the act of forgiveness is 51
elective, though, there is always a possibility that our reasons were not as good as we had 
thought they were. And this means that there can be no guarantee that forgiveness will be 
uncompromising. For example, a person’s attempt at forgiveness might end up, for 
 Merleau-Ponty (1973, p. 86).50
 Cf. Hieronymi (2001, p. 536).51
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reasons outside her control, appearing to the wrongdoer as acquiescence to the 
disrespectful treatment or as signaling that the wrong was not very serious. Perhaps the 
forgiver will have misread the signs of the wrongdoer’s good will because of an 
unacknowledged desire to avoid conflict or to be accepted by him. Perhaps. After all, 
none of us are fully transparent to ourselves. Nonetheless, there is no reason in principle 
to believe that attempts to forswear resentment and to reconcile with potentially 
unrepentant wrongdoers necessarily express a lack of self-respect or a belief that the 
wrong was not very serious. If forgiveness is something more than a highly coded, quasi-
administrative procedure for reconciling relationships—if, as Lucy Allais suggests, it is 
essentially an act of generosity—then there can be no forgiveness that is not at least 
somewhat risky.  This is a feature it shares with all acts of institution. And so the attempt 52
to forgive without having received an apology no more expresses a lack of self-respect 
than the attempt of an artist to institute new literary or painterly sense, without the 
guarantee of success, expresses a lack of artistic integrity. Of course the account of 
forgiveness as institution cannot show that forgiveness is necessarily uncompromising. 
But I do not believe any adequate account of forgiveness could show that. What such an 
account can show, though, is that electiveness, articulateness, and uncompromisingness 
are perfectly compatible, and it can do so without presenting an unnecessarily 
deflationary view of any of these conditions. And this, I believe, gives it a plausible claim 
to being a more successful account of forgiveness than its rivals. 
 Cf. North (1987, p. 505): “If I am to forgive I must risk extending my trust and affection, with no 52
guarantee that they will not be flung back in my face or forfeited again in the future. One might even say 
that forgiveness is an unconditional response to the wrongdoer, for there is something unforgiving in the 
demand for guarantees.”
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